Iustitia in Anselms Cur Deus Homo?

INTRODUCTION

Anselm of Canterbury is considered the most significant and influential early medieval figure to explore the idea of iustitia as it pertains to the relationship between God and humanity,[1] more specifically, to the doctrine of atonement.[2] Anselm’s purpose of Cur Deus Homo? is to prove the Atonement via the Incarnation is required to be fact[3] assuming the absence of a historical Jesus.[4] This research paper’s thesis will examine the concept of iustitia in the development of Anselm’s Satisfaction theory of atonement and provide evidence proving the validity of the theory in light of three influential modern critiques. The forthcoming study will provide a brief overview of iustitia as a foundational argument of Cur Deus Homo? and systematically disprove the contemporary criticisms that Anselm’s theory is based on secular legal egalitarianism and merit, renders the Incarnation ineffective due to the inability of guilt to be transferred, and is completely speculative with no relation to Scripture.

AS AN ARGUMENT OF CUR DEUS HOMO?

Anselm provides a series of arguments that illuminate the fundamental concept of iustitia in an attempt to explain why God became man.[5] At creation humans lived in an environment of original justice,[6] which allowed humanity to experience blessedness not accessible in a life with sin[7] as reconciliation with God is impossible with sin.[8] Sin is defined as not rendering to God what is due.[9] Anselm specifically states, “Sin is nothing other than not to give God what is owed to him,” and continues by clarifying that “all the will of a rational creature ought to be subject to the will of God,” which is man’s debt to God.[10]  More importantly, it is the righteousness of the will that “makes individuals righteous or upright in their heart, that is, their will,” which is the “sole honour, the complete honour, which we owe to God and which God demands from us.”[11] The blessedness experienced from original justice mandates the “perfect and voluntary submission of the human will to God – that is, iustitia.”[12]

Due to the effects of sin, humanity is in an utter state of destitution, an unreasonable outcome of God’s original plan[13] – that is, iniustitia.[14] Accordingly, either humanity is denied blessedness or it is necessary for the circumstance to be resolved by satisfaction[15] requiring either punitive measures or a form of remuneration,[16] otherwise, God would “not be just to himself.”[17] Furthermore, the remuneration must incorporate what is not due to God as a debtor,[18] that is, the satisfaction is required to go beyond the disobedient act.[19] Anselm illustrates by explaining that larceny is not rectified by simply returning stolen goods, instead, the criminal is required to remit to the injured party remuneration in excess of the value of the seized property.[20] Boso astutely determines that since justice requires complete obedience[21] that even if sin does not occur, there is nothing to give God as compensation for the sin that already exists.[22] In other words, humanity has nothing to offer to God other than what iustitia already demands and “on account of their present iniustitia, they cannot even do that.”[23] Accordingly, Anselm asks, “what, then, will become of you? How will you be saved?”[24]

The purpose of God’s creation has been unjustly obstructed and is inconsistent with God’s supreme nature, thus it is an absolute necessity that a method of redeeming mankind exists to restore justice.[25] In order to maintain justice based on the current propositions established, the method of redemption must not restore humanity through forgiveness unless the sinner has “repaid to God what he has taken away from him”[26] and compensated God with something that is not already owed to God.[27] Furthermore, humanity is completely incapable of procuring redemption for itself due to its inability to provide proper satisfaction,[28] accordingly, the payment needs made by someone greater than all that exists separate from God.[29]  Logic necessarily concludes that since “there is nothing superior to all that exists which is not God – except God,” payment is required to be paid by no one other than God.[30]

Although God solely has the capacity to redeem, the obligation for adequate compensation continues to rest entirely with humanity because “whenever we knowingly do anything, however small, contrary to the will of God,” mankind frustrates God’s justice.[31] In other words, since God has the means to pay but “no one ought to pay except man: it is necessary that a God-Man should pay it,”[32] and an absolute necessity for the Incarnation to occur in order to provide adequate satisfaction.[33] God’s justice is now aligned with God’s mercy and a “greater and juster mercy cannot be imagined”[34] as a result of the Incarnation that occurred as a requirement of God’s supreme justice.[35]

AS SUPREME JUSTICE

The first influential criticism of iustitia in Anselm is provided by followers of the Tübingen school, such as Albrecht Ritschl, who believe Anselm’s satisfaction theory is “quite misdirected.”[36] More specifically, Ritschl believes Anselm’s theory provides an unfounded secular legal egalitarianism between humanity and God due to Anselm’s analogies to civil jurisprudence[37] and concludes that Anselm ultimately “exchanges the idea of satisfaction for the altogether different idea of merit.”[38]

Rationally, it would seem highly unlikely that Anselm would have approved of such an overtly superficial humanistic view of secular law to be foundational to his work.[39] Three examples are supportive. First, Anselm does not associate the word “debt” with an archaic and rudimentary system of payback; instead, he utilized the identical word used in the Vulgate to define sin in the Lord’s Prayer.[40] Next, although feudal law did support the concept of an individual making satisfaction for another person’s wrongdoing, if a strict analogy is to be assumed, the act of voluntary satisfaction seems unreasonable,[41] the fact that God does not benefit from the transaction[42] does not compute, and logic is again defied because human’s cannot benefit from satisfaction passively as a feudal recipient, but instead, must actively engage Christ.[43] Finally, historicity suggests Anselm was uninterested in medieval investiture and perceived himself as a monk who would have certainly discovered the context for “honor” in Scripture, not as a way to pacify God, but instead a way to extend worship to his Creator whom he owed his all.[44]

In actuality, Anselm does the opposite of what the Tübingen critics claim by disassociating from the finite perception of human justice by scrutinizing a number of different views of iustitia before determining the most relevant form that represents God’s treatment of humanity[45] – “summa iustitia.”[46] Supreme justice, differing from secular justice, is “understood as action directed towards the highest good” based on what is suitable to God, which encompasses the redemption of humanity, not based on the idea that God is rewarding humanity based on their merit.[47] To fully comprehend Anselm’s perspective of justice one must refer to his treatise On Truth, which consociates truth, rectitude and justice[48] and defines justice as the “rectitude of the will that is preserved for its own sake.”[49] The fundamental principle supporting Anselm’s view of justice is rectitude, which includes both truth, the transforming of thoughts into what are right, and justice, the transforming of actions into what are right.[50] Anselm’s supreme justice defined as loving the highest good is appropriated via our thoughts and actions, but is only available to humanity if it is “in a state of no want,” otherwise the will is tainted and, accordingly, the alignment of the will with the highest good would be impossible.[51]  For justice to be served, humanity’s state of want must be eradicated, which is only possible “in a person in whom there is such pure righteousness that there is no wrongdoing in him.”[52] The process of restoring humanity to its original “state of blessed happiness”[53] by gifting the righteousness necessary to support God’s supreme justice appears to be a preposterous notion within the human context of “distributive or retributive justice.”[54] Thus, the justice legislating secular human affairs, such as the Ciceronian and Justinian perspective of jurisprudence, can in no way be deemed equivalent to Anselm’s perspective of justice which legislates the affairs between God and humanity.[55]

AS A NECESSITY OF THE INCARNATION

The second significant criticism that attempts to discredit Anselm’s concept of iustitia originates from the work of Jasper Hopkins and Philip Quinn who suggest that “making satisfaction requires being guilty.”[56] According to Hopkins, the Incarnation is rendered ineffective in Anselm’s satisfaction theory by assuming a debt of moral obligation can be assigned in the same manner as a financial obligation and since “guilt cannot be transferred…it cannot be removed by compensation.”[57]

Quinn and Hopkins appear to have inadequately investigated Anselm’s perspective of the debt incurred from sin by ignoring the required liberation from two separate debts . [58]   In order to fully understand Anselm’s dual view of debt pertaining to justice, a reference to his work, On the Virgin Conception and Original Sin, is required:

Indeed, the sin that is contracted at his origin is called ‘original’, which could also be expressed as ‘natural’ sin, not because it comes from the essence of nature, but because it is taken up with corrupted nature. But the sin that each man commits after he has become a person can be called ‘personal’ sin, because it comes about through a fault in the person. We can use the same term to speak of ‘original’ and ‘personal’ justice: so Adam and Eve were ‘originally’ just, that is, they were just as soon as they began to exist as humans. But justice can be called personal, if an unjust man is given justice which he did not originally have.[59]

Natural debt is procured by humanity through a genetic connection to the original sin of Adam, which holds all of mankind responsible for the fall, whereas personal debt exists due to personal disobedience that causes actual sin to be committed.[60] Although in order for Anselm’s theory to stand, both debts, natural and personal “must be compensated for by the universal satisfaction of the Deus-homo,” but it is important to note that the strategy deployed to satisfy each type of debt is distinct.[61]

The natural debt is resolved and justice is preserved if the obligation is satisfied within the confines of two conditions. First, since God’s honor was taken through man’s disobedience, the natural debt obligation lies solely with man, accordingly, the vindicator must either be Adam, Eve, or a descendent from Adam to provide proper recompense on behalf of mankind.[62]  Second, the vindicator must also be qualified, that is, possess a will that infinitely aligns with God’s, without coercion, and provide a satisfaction that exceeds “the value of all created things.”[63] Since Christ has two natures, the natural debt is effectively resolved as His human nature satisfies the requirement of lineage and His divine nature satisfies the requirement of faculty.[64]

The strategy employed to resolve personal debt, in contrast to natural debt, does not occur vicariously, that is, on behalf of the guilty, thus, the necessity of a transfer mechanism is eliminated.[65] In fact, the correct strategy evolves from the philosophical argument that because the personal debt is infinite and individuals cannot be held accountable for the innate finiteness that results in an inability to repay the personal debt, justice necessitates that individuals are “not obligated to pay it” and the guilt is retained.[66]  Accordingly, though natural debt is satisfied, God is not, per se, required to forgive personal debt, however, because finite individuals have no method of repayment available, justice permits God to extend forgiveness to individuals who repent and request forgiveness.[67] The proper understanding of the two categories of offense keeps Anselm’s satisfaction theory intact and renders the criticisms of Hopkins and Quinn invalid.[68]

AS A REQUIREMENT OF SCRIPTURE

The final notable criticism leveled against Anselm’s concept of iustitia once again emerges from a Tübingen perspective. Specifically, Ritschl suggests that “fundamentally the doctrine of Anselm has no relation to Scripture, but moves entirely amid considerations of the natural reason.”[69] Foley continues the argument by explaining that Anselm’s work may have had a strong apologetic value if Anselm’s doctrine would have “coincided with the Apostolic conceptions of the work of Christ,”[70] and with a reference to Ferdinand Baur, concludes Anselm’s work is “exclusively speculative and rationalistic” with a perspective completely alien to New Testament writers. [71] It is conceded that Anselm’s purpose was to provide a work for unbelievers with an apologetic inclination delivered without the presumption of a historical Christ, but to conclude no Scriptural basis in Anselm’s theory is to go too far.[72]  An exploration of the biblical basis of Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo? regarding two primary principles of iustitia in Anselm’s theory – substitution and honor – are presented for consideration.

First, regarding the substitutionary aspect of the theory it is difficult to ignore Paul’s letter to the Galatians stating, “Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law, having become a curse for us,”[73] which is considered a powerful assertion of substitutionary atonement.[74] Paul also states that Christ became “sin on our behalf”[75] and that God presents Christ as a “Sacrifice of atonement,” rendered propitiation in the New American Standard.[76] Furthermore, Paul explains that Christ was “delivered over because of our transgressions, and was raised because of our justification,”[77] suggesting Christ’s life was to “pay a redemptive price” for individual’s sins in order that God would be justified in extending forgiveness.[78] Most poignantly, however, may be 1 Peter summarily stating that Christ “died for sins once for all, the just for the unjust, so that he might bring us to God,”[79] with the phrase “just for the unjust” being a clear indication of the substitutionary nature of the death of Christ.[80]

Second, Anselm’s biblical basis for honor would have undoubtedly been found in the monk’s daily Scripture reading.[81] Christ’s honor is referenced clearly in 2 Peter, which states that “He received honor, and glory from God the Father,”[82] and Revelation provides a number of references to God’s honor including the declaration that “living creatures give glory and honour and thanks to Him who sits on the throne.”[83] Paul may even have proposed that just recompense[84] may also pertain to humanity’s honor by suggesting it may be a legitimate human aspiration.[85]

Although the documentation of a biblical basis for Anselm’s work could be significantly augmented into areas of righteousness, sin, revelation, the Garden, and Adam, for our purposes, it is not necessary.  Without a doubt the evidence shows that to conclude that Anselm has “no relation to Scripture,”[86] and that his work is “exclusively speculative”[87] appears a reckless disregard of reasonable alternatives of exegesis relevant to New Testament Scripture.

CONCLUSION

The influence of iustitia in Anselm’s theory of satisfaction cannot be underestimated in either its scope or its impact on the history of doctrine. The concept of iustitia lays the framework for Anselm’s theory in relation to creation, the defining of sin, the necessity of the Incarnation, and in the redemption of humanity. Furthermore, the criticism that iustitia is undermined by an application of secular jurisprudence applied to the relationship of God and humanity in Anselm’s theory has been disproved. The attempt to discredit Anselm’s concept of iustitia by suggesting that a moral obligation is handled in the same manner as a financial obligation, thus, redemption is not available via satisfaction because guilt cannot be transferred has also been rebutted. Finally, the criticism leveled against iustitia accusing Anselm’s work of being exclusively speculative by having no relation to Scripture has been thwarted. Iustitia as a basis of Anselm’s Satisfaction theory of atonement remains intact. For further study on the doctrine of atonement, Alister McGrath’s comprehensiveIustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification is considered to be the most thorough treatment of the history of the doctrine since Albrecht Ritschl’s more liberal treatment in A Critical History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation.

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